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is likely to be better which is more like the better. This too,
however, admits of an objection: for quite possibly the one only
slightly resembles the better, while the other strongly resembles the
worse, e.g. supposing the resemblance of Ajax to Achilles to be
slight, while that of Odysseus to Nestor is strong. Also it may be
that the one which is like the better type shows a degrading likeness,
whereas the one which is like the worse type improves upon it: witness
the likeness of a horse to a donkey, and that of a monkey to a man.
Another rule is that the more conspicuous good is more desirable than
the less conspicuous, and the more difficult than the easier: for we
appreciate better the possession of things that cannot be easily
acquired. Also the more personal possession is more desirable than the
more widely shared. Also, that which is more free from connexion with
evil: for what is not attended by any unpleasantness is more desirable
than what is so attended.
Moreover, if A be without qualification better than B, then also the
best of the members of A is better than the best of the members of B;
e.g. if Man be better than Horse, then also the best man is better
than the best horse. Also, if the best in A be better than the best in
B, then also A is better than B without qualification; e.g. if the
best man be better than the best horse, then also Man is better than
Horse without qualification.
Moreover, things which our friends can share are more desirable than
those they cannot. Also, things which we like rather to do to our
friend are more desirable than those we like to do to the man in the
street, e.g. just dealing and the doing of good rather than the
semblance of them: for we would rather really do good to our friends
than seem to do so, whereas towards the man in the street the converse
is the case.
Also, superfluities are better than necessities, and are sometimes
more desirable as well: for the good life is better than mere life,
and good life is a superfluity, whereas mere life itself is a
necessity. Sometimes, though, what is better is not also more
desirable: for there is no necessity that because it is better it
should also be more desirable: at least to be a philosopher is better
than to make money, but it is not more desirable for a man who lacks
the necessities of life. The expression 'superfluity' applies whenever
a man possesses the necessities of life and sets to work to secure as
well other noble acquisitions. Roughly speaking, perhaps, necessities
are more desirable, while superfluities are better.
Also, what cannot be got from another is more desirable than what can
be got from another as well, as (e.g.) is the case of justice compared
with courage. Also, A is more desirable if A is desirable without B,
but not B without A: power (e.g.) is not desirable without prudence,
but prudence is desirable without power. Also, if of two things we
repudiate the one in order to be thought to possess the other, then
that one is more desirable which we wish to be thought to possess;
thus (e.g.) we repudiate the love of hard work in order that people
may think us geniuses.
Moreover, that is more desirable in whose absence it is less
blameworthy for people to be vexed; and that is more desirable in
whose absence it is more blameworthy for a man not to be vexed.
Part 3
Moreover, of things that belong to the same species one which
possesses the peculiar virtue of the species is more desirable than
one which does not. If both possess it, then the one which possesses
it in a greater degree is more desirable.
Moreover, if one thing makes good whatever it touches, while another
does not, the former is more desirable, just as also what makes things
warm is warmer than what does not. If both do so, then that one is
more desirable which does so in a greater degree, or if it render good
the better and more important object-if (e.g.), the one makes good the
soul, and the other the body.
Moreover, judge things by their inflexions and uses and actions and