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works, and judge these by them: for they go with each other: e.g. if
'justly' means something more desirable than 'courageously', then also
justice means something more desirable than courage; and if justice be
more desirable than courage, then also 'justly' means something more
desirable than 'courageously'. Similarly also in the other cases.
Moreover, if one thing exceeds while the other falls short of the same
standard of good, the one which exceeds is the more desirable; or if
the one exceeds an even higher standard. Nay more, if there be two
things both preferable to something, the one which is more highly
preferable to it is more desirable than the less highly preferable.
Moreover, when the excess of a thing is more desirable than the excess
of something else, that thing is itself also more desirable than the
other, as (e.g.) friendship than money: for an excess of friendship is
more desirable than an excess of money. So also that of which a man
would rather that it were his by his own doing is more desirable than
what he would rather get by another's doing, e.g. friends than money.
Moreover, judge by means of an addition, and see if the addition of A
to the same thing as B makes the whole more desirable than does the
addition of B. You must, however, beware of adducing a case in which
the common term uses, or in some other way helps the case of, one of
the things added to it, but not the other, as (e.g.) if you took a saw
and a sickle in combination with the art of carpentry: for in the
combination the saw is a more desirable thing, but it is not a more
desirable thing without qualification. Again, a thing is more
desirable if, when added to a lesser good, it makes the whole greater
good. Likewise, also, you should judge by means of subtraction: for
the thing upon whose subtraction the remainder is a lesser good may be
taken to be a greater good, whichever it be whose subtraction makes
the remainder a lesser good.
Also, if one thing be desirable for itself, and the other for the look
of it, the former is more desirable, as (e.g.) health than beauty. A
thing is defined as being desired for the look of it if, supposing no
one knew of it, you would not care to have it. Also, it is more
desirable both for itself and for the look of it, while the other
thing is desirable on the one ground alone. Also, whichever is the
more precious for itself, is also better and more desirable. A thing
may be taken to be more precious in itself which we choose rather for
itself, without anything else being likely to come of it.
Moreover, you should distinguish in how many senses 'desirable' is
used, and with a view to what ends, e.g. expediency or honour or
pleasure. For what is useful for all or most of them may be taken to
be more desirable than what is not useful in like manner. If the same
characters belong to both things you should look and see which
possesses them more markedly, i.e. which of the two is the more
pleasant or more honourable or more expedient. Again, that is more
desirable which serves the better purpose, e.g. that which serves to
promote virtue more than that which serves to promote pleasure.
Likewise also in the case of objectionable things; for that is more
objectionable which stands more in the way of what is desirable, e.g.
disease more than ugliness: for disease is a greater hindrance both to
pleasure and to being good.
Moreover, argue by showing that the thing in question is in like
measure objectionable and desirable: for a thing of such a character
that a man might well desire and object to it alike is less desirable
than the other which is desirable only.
Part 4
Comparisons of things together should therefore be conducted in the
manner prescribed. The same commonplace rules are useful also for
showing that anything is simply desirable or objectionable: for we
have only to subtract the excess of one thing over another. For if
what is more precious be more desirable, then also what is precious is
desirable; and if what is more useful be more desirable, then also
what is useful is desirable. Likewise, also, in the case of other
things which admit of comparisons of that kind. For in some cases in