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knowledge will be in some cases an evil thing; e.g. if for a man to
forget his disgraceful conduct be a good thing, and to remember it be
an evil thing, then the knowledge of his disgraceful conduct may be
taken to be an evil thing. The same holds also in other cases: in all
such cases the premiss and the conclusion are equally likely to be
accepted.
Moreover you should judge by means of greater or smaller or like
degrees: for if some member of another genus exhibit such and such a
character in a more marked degree than your object, while no member of
that genus exhibits that character at all, then you may take it that
neither does the object in question exhibit it; e.g. if some form of
knowledge be good in a greater degree than pleasure, while no form of
knowledge is good, then you may take it that pleasure is not good
either. Also, you should judge by a smaller or like degree in the same
way: for so you will find it possible both to demolish and to
establish a view, except that whereas both are possible by means of
like degrees, by means of a smaller degree it is possible only to
establish, not to overthrow. For if a certain form of capacity be good
in a like degree to knowledge, and a certain form of capacity be good,
then so also is knowledge; while if no form of capacity be good, then
neither is knowledge. If, too, a certain form of capacity be good in a
less degree than knowledge, and a certain form of capacity be good,
then so also is knowledge; but if no form of capacity be good, there
is no necessity that no form of knowledge either should be good.
Clearly, then, it is only possible to establish a view by means of a
less degree.
Not only by means of another genus can you overthrow a view, but also
by means of the same, if you take the most marked instance of the
character in question; e.g. if it be maintained that some form of
knowledge is good, then, suppose it to be shown that prudence is not
good, neither will any other kind be good, seeing that not even the
kind upon which there is most general agreement is so. Moreover, you
should go to work by means of an hypothesis; you should claim that the
attribute, if it belongs or does not belong in one case, does so in a
like degree in all, e.g. that if the soul of man be immortal, so are
other souls as well, while if this one be not so, neither are the
others. If, then, it be maintained that in some instance the attribute
belongs, you must show that in some instance it does not belong: for
then it will follow, by reason of the hypothesis, that it does not
belong to any instance at all. If, on the other hand, it be maintained
that it does not belong in some instance, you must show that it does
belong in some instance, for in this way it will follow that it
belongs to all instances. It is clear that the maker of the hypothesis
universalizes the question, whereas it was stated in a particular
form: for he claims that the maker of a particular admission should
make a universal admission, inasmuch as he claims that if the
attribute belongs in one instance, it belongs also in all instances
alike.
If the problem be indefinite, it is possible to overthrow a statement
in only one way; e.g. if a man has asserted that pleasure is good or
is not good, without any further definition. For if he meant that a
particular pleasure is good, you must show universally that no
pleasure is good, if the proposition in question is to be demolished.
And likewise, also, if he meant that some particular pleasure is not
good you must show universally that all pleasure is good: it is
impossible to demolish it in any other way. For if we show that some
particular pleasure is not good or is good, the proposition in
question is not yet demolished. It is clear, then, that it is possible
to demolish an indefinite statement in one way only, whereas it can be
established in two ways: for whether we show universally that all
pleasure is good, or whether we show that a particular pleasure is
good, the proposition in question will have been proved. Likewise,
also, supposing we are required to argue that some particular pleasure
is not good, if we show that no pleasure is good or that a particular