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this is impossible, for memory is always found in the soul. The
aforesaid commonplace rule is common to the subject of Accident as
well: for it is all the same to say that 'abiding' is the genus of
memory, or to allege that it is an accident of it. For if in any way
whatever memory be the abiding of knowledge, the same argument in
regard to it will apply.
Part 5
Again, see if he has placed what is a 'state' inside the genus
'activity', or an activity inside the genus 'state', e.g. by defining
'sensation' as 'movement communicated through the body': for sensation
is a 'state', whereas movement is an 'activity'. Likewise, also, if he
has said that memory is a 'state that is retentive of a conception',
for memory is never a state, but rather an activity.
They also make a bad mistake who rank a 'state' within the 'capacity'
that attends it, e.g. by defining 'good temper' as the 'control of
anger', and 'courage' and 'justice' as 'control of fears' and of
'gains': for the terms 'courageous' and 'good-tempered' are applied to
a man who is immune from passion, whereas 'self-controlled' describes
the man who is exposed to passion and not led by it. Quite possibly,
indeed, each of the former is attended by a capacity such that, if he
were exposed to passion, he would control it and not be led by it:
but, for all that, this is not what is meant by being 'courageous' in
the one case, and 'good tempered' in the other; what is meant is an
absolute immunity from any passions of that kind at all.
Sometimes, also, people state any kind of attendant feature as the
genus, e.g. 'pain' as the genus of 'anger' and 'conception' as that of
conviction'. For both of the things in question follow in a certain
sense upon the given species, but neither of them is genus to it. For
when the angry man feels pain, the pain bas appeared in him earlier
than the anger: for his anger is not the cause of his pain, but his
pain of his anger, so that anger emphatically is not pain. By the same
reasoning, neither is conviction conception: for it is possible to
have the same conception even without being convinced of it, whereas
this is impossible if conviction be a species of conception: for it is
impossible for a thing still to remain the same if it be entirely
transferred out of its species, just as neither could the same animal
at one time be, and at another not be, a man. If, on the other hand,
any one says that a man who has a conception must of necessity be also
convinced of it, then 'conception' and 'conviction' will be used with
an equal denotation, so that not even so could the former be the genus
of the latter: for the denotation of the genus should be wider.
See, also, whether both naturally come to be anywhere in the same
thing: for what contains the species contains the genus as well: e.g.
what contains 'white' contains 'colour' as well, and what contains
'knowledge of grammar' contains 'knowledge' as well. If, therefore,
any one says that 'shame' is 'fear', or that 'anger' is 'pain', the
result will be that genus and species are not found in the same thing:
for shame is found in the 'reasoning' faculty, whereas fear is in the
'spirited' faculty, and 'pain' is found in the faculty of 'desires'.
(for in this pleasure also is found), whereas 'anger' is found in the
'spirited' faculty. Hence the terms rendered are not the genera,
seeing that they do not naturally come to be in the same faculty as
the species. Likewise, also, if 'friendship' be found in the faculty
of desires, you may take it that it is not a form of 'wishing': for
wishing is always found in the 'reasoning' faculty. This commonplace
rule is useful also in dealing with Accident: for the accident and
that of which it is an accident are both found in the same thing, so
that if they do not appear in the same thing, clearly it is not an
accident.
Again, see if the species partakes of the genus attributed only in
some particular respect: for it is the general view that the genus is
not thus imparted only in some particular respect: for a man is not an
animal in a particular respect, nor is grammar knowledge in a
particular respect only. Likewise also in other instances. Look,