{26} Ask yourselves, in God's
name, why it is that there is no one in Byzantium to tell the Byzantines that
they must not occupy Chalcedon,[n] which belongs to the king and formerly
belonged to you, but upon which they had no sort of claim; or that they must not
make Selymbria, once your ally, a contributory portion of the Byzantine state;
or include the territory of Selymbria[n] within the Byzantine frontier, in
defiance of the sworn treaty which ordains the independence of the cities?

{27} Why was there no one to tell Mausolus, while he lived, and Artemisia after his
death, that they must not occupy Cos and Rhodes and other Hellenic cities as
well, which the king their master ceded to the Hellenes by the treaty,[n] and
for the sake of which the Hellenes of those days faced many a peril and fought
many a gallant fight? Even if there actually are such advisers[n] in both cases,
at least it is not likely that they will find listeners.

{28} For my part I
believe that it is right to restore the exiled democracy of Rhodes. But even if
it were not right, I think it would be proper to urge you to do it, when I
consider the course taken by such speakers as these; and for this reason. If all
the world, men of Athens, were bent upon doing right, it would be a disgrace to
us if we alone were unwilling to do so: but when all the world is preparing
itself in order to be able to commit wrong, then for us alone to abstain from
every enterprise, on the plea of right, is no righteousness, to my mind, but
cowardice. For I observe that the extent to which rights are admitted is always
in proportion to the claimant's power at the moment.

{29} I can illustrate this
by an instance familiar to all of you. There are two treaties[n] between the
Hellenes and the king. The first was made by our own city, and all men praise
it; the second by the Spartans, and it is denounced by all. The rights defined
in these two treaties are not the same. For whereas a common and equal share of
private rights is given by law to weak and strong alike, in a settlement of
international rights it is the stronger who legislate for the weaker.

Well, you already know what the right course is.[n]

{30} It remains to inquire
how you can carry out your knowledge into action; and this will be possible, if
you come to be regarded as public champions of universal liberty. But the great
difficulty which you find in doing your duty is, to my mind, natural enough. All
other men have only one conflict to face--the conflict with their declared foes;
and when these are subdued, there is no further obstacle to their secure
enjoyment of their happiness.

{31} But for you there is a double conflict. In
addition to that to which all men are liable, there is another which is harder,
and which must be faced first: for you have to win the victory in your councils
over those who are deliberately working in your midst against the interests of
the city; and because, thanks to them, you can effect nothing that is demanded
of you without a struggle, it is natural that you should often miss your mark.

{32} The chief reason for the fearless adoption of such a course in public life
by so many men is perhaps to be found in the benefits which they obtain from
those who hire them. Yet at the same time, some of the blame may fairly be laid
at your own doors. For you ought, men of Athens, to think of a man's post in
public life as you think of his post in the army in the field. And how do you
think of this? If a man leaves the post assigned to him by his general, you
think that he deserves to be disfranchised and to lose all share in the
privileges of a citizen.

{33} And so when men desert the post of civil duty,
committed to them by our forefathers, and follow an oligarchical[n] policy, they
should forfeit the privilege of acting as advisers to yourselves. As it is,