by Time: for the time that has passed has been long, and still no generation has
arisen, whose achievements could be compared with advantage to theirs.

{2} As for myself, I shall attempt to point out the way in which, in my opinion, you
can best make your preparations. For the truth is, that if all of us who propose
to address you were to succeed in proving to you our rhetorical skill, there
would not be the slightest improvement in your condition--I am sure of it; but
if a single speaker were to come forward, whoever he might be, who could
instruct and convince you as to the nature of the preparations which would meet
the city's need, as to their extent, and the resources upon which we can draw
for them, your present fears would instantly be dissolved. This I will attempt
to do--if indeed it is in my power. But first I must briefly express my views as
to our relations with the king.

{3} I hold the king to be the common enemy of all the Hellenes; and yet I should
not on that account urge you, alone and unsupported, to raise war against him.
For I observe that there is no common or mutual friendship even among the
Hellenes themselves: some have more faith in the king than in some other
Hellenes. When such are the conditions, your interest requires you, I believe,
to see to it that you only begin war from a fair and just cause, and to make all
proper preparations: this should be the basis of your policy.

{4} For I believe,
men of Athens, that if it were made plain to the eyes and understandings of the
Hellenes, that the king was making an attempt upon them, they would both fight
in alliance with those who undertook the defence for them and with them, and
would feel very grateful to them. But if we quarrel with him prematurely, while
his intentions are still uncertain, I am afraid, men of Athens, that we may be
forced to fight not only against the king, but also against those for whose
benefit we are exercising such forethought.

{5} For he will pause in the
execution of his project, if indeed he has really resolved to attack the
Hellenes, and will bribe some of them with money and offers of friendship; while
they, desirous of bringing their private wars to a successful end, and animated
only by such a spirit, will disregard the common safety of all. I urge you then,
not to hurl the city needlessly into the midst of any such chaos of selfish
passions.

{6} Moreover, I see that the question of the policy to be adopted
towards the king does not even stand on the same footing for the other Hellenes
as for you. It is open, I think, to many of them to manage certain of their own
interests as they please, and to disregard the rest of the Hellenes. But for you
it is not honourable, even if you are the injured party, and are dealing with
those who have injured you, to punish them so severely as to leave some of them
to fall under the domination of the foreigner:

{7} and this being so, we must
take care, first, that we do not find ourselves involved in an unequal war, and
secondly, that he, whom we believe to be plotting against the Hellenes, does not
gain credit from the supposition that he is their friend. How then can this be
achieved? It will be achieved if it is manifest to all that the forces of Athens
have been overhauled and put in readiness, and if her intentions in regard to
their use are plainly righteous.

{8} But to those who take a bold line, and urge
you, without any hesitation whatever, to go to war, my reply is this--that it is
not difficult to win a reputation for bravery, when the occasion calls for
deliberation; nor to prove yourself an accomplished orator, when danger is at
the door: but to display your courage in the hour of danger, and, in debate, to
have wiser advice to offer than others--that is the hard thing, and that is what
is required of you.

{9} For my part, men of Athens, I consider that the proposed