Discourses - Book I   

that what is by nature free can be disturbed by anything else, or
hindered by any other thing than by itself. But it is a man's own
opinions which disturb him: for when the tyrant says to a man, "I will
chain your leg," he who values his leg says, "Do not; have pity":
but he who values his own will says, "If it appears more
advantageous to you, chain it." "Do you not care?" I do not care. "I
will show you that I am master." You cannot do that. Zeus has set me
free: do you think that he intended to allow his own son to be
enslaved? But you are master of my carcass: take it. "So when you
approach me, you have no regard to me?" No, but I have regard to
myself; and if you wish me to say that I have regard to you also, I
tell you that I have the same regard to you that I have to my pipkin.
This is not a perverse self-regard, for the animal is constituted so
as to do all things for itself. For even the sun does all things for
itself; nay, even Zeus himself. But when he chooses to be the Giver of
rain and the Giver of fruits, and the Father of gods and men, you
see that he cannot obtain these functions and these names, if he is
not useful to man; and, universally, he has made the nature of the
rational animal such that it cannot obtain any one of its own proper
interests, if it does not contribute something to the common interest.
In this manner and sense it is not unsociable for a man to do
everything, for the sake of himself. For what do you expect? that a
man should neglect himself and his own interest? And how in that
case can there be one and the same principle in all animals, the
principle of attachment to themselves?
What then? when absurd notions about things independent of our will,
as if they were good and bad, lie at the bottom of our opinions, we
must of necessity pay regard to tyrants; for I wish that men would pay
regard to tyrants only, and not also to the bedchamber men. How is
it that the man becomes all at once wise, when Caesar has made him
superintendent of the close stool? How is it that we say
immediately, "Felicion spoke sensibly to me." I wish he were ejected
from the bedchamber, that he might again appear to you to be a fool.
Epaphroditus had a shoemaker whom he sold because he was good for
nothing. This fellow by some good luck was bought by one of Caesar's
men, and became Caesar's shoemaker. You should have seen what
respect Epaphroditus paid to him: "How does the good Felicion do, I
pray?" Then if any of us asked, "What is master doing?" the answer "He
is consulting about something with Felicion." Had he not sold the
man as good for nothing? Who then made him wise all at once? This is
an instance of valuing something else than the things which depend
on the will.
Has a man been exalted to the tribuneship? All who meet him offer
their congratulations; one kisses his eyes, another the neck, and
the slaves kiss his hands. He goes to his house, he finds torches
lighted. He ascends the Capitol: he offers a sacrifice of the
occasion. Now who ever sacrificed for having had good desires? for
having acted conformably to nature? For in fact we thank the gods
for those things in which we place our good.
A person was talking to me to-day about the priesthood of