Discourses - Book I   

that I say so; but there is no difference in these matters. "In
what, then, is the difference?" Seek and you will find that there is a
difference in another matter. See whether it is not in a man the
understanding of what he does, see if it is not in social community,
in fidelity, in modesty, in steadfastness, in intelligence. Where then
is the great good and evil in men? It is where the difference is. If
the difference is preserved and remains fenced round, and neither
modesty is destroyed, nor fidelity, nor intelligence, then the man
also is preserved; but if any of these things is destroyed and stormed
like a city, then the man too perishes; and in this consist the
great things. Paris, you say, sustained great damage, then, when the
Hellenes invaded and when they ravaged Troy, and when his brothers
perished. By no means; for no man is damaged by an action which is not
his own; but what happened at that time was only the destruction of
storks' nests: now the ruin of Paris was when he lost the character of
modesty, fidelity, regard to hospitality, and to decency. When was
Achilles ruined? Was it when Patroclus died? Not so. But it happened
when he began to be angry, when he wept for a girl, when he forgot
that he was at Troy not to get mistresses, but to fight. These
things are the ruin of men, this is being besieged, this is the
destruction of cities, when right opinions are destroyed, when they
are corrupted.
"When, then, women are carried off, when children are made captives,
and when the men are killed, are these not evils?" How is it then that
you add to the facts these opinions? Explain this to me also. "I shall
not do that; but how is it that you say that these are not evils?" Let
us come to the rules: produce the precognitions: for it is because
this is neglected that we cannot sufficiently wonder at what men do.
When we intend to judge of weights, we do not judge by guess: where we
intend to judge of straight and crooked, we do not judge by guess.
In all cases where it is our interest to know what is true in any
matter, never will any man among us do anything by guess. But in
things which depend on the first and on the only cause of doing
right or wrong, of happiness or unhappiness, of being unfortunate or
fortunate, there only we are inconsiderate and rash. There is then
nothing like scales, nothing like a rule: but some appearance is
presented, and straightway I act according to it. Must I then
suppose that I am superior to Achilles or Agamemnon, so that they by
following appearances do and suffer so many evils: and shall not the
appearance be sufficient for me? And what tragedy has any other
beginning? The Atreus of Euripides, what is it? An appearance. The
OEdipus of Sophocles, what is it? An appearance. The Phoenix? An
appearance. The Hippolytus? An appearance. What kind of a man then
do you suppose him to be who pays no regard to this matter? And what
is the name of those who follow every appearance? "They are called
madmen." Do we then act at all differently?

CHAPTER 29

On constancy