to show us the truth which relates to happiness, shall we not thank
God for this?

CHAPTER 5

Against the academics

If a man, said Epictetus, opposes evident truths, it is not easy
to find arguments by which we shall make him change his opinion. But
this does not arise either from the man's strength or the teacher's
weakness; for when the man, though he has been confuted, is hardened
like a stone, how shall we then be able to deal with him by argument?
Now there are two kinds of hardening, one of the understanding,
the other of the sense of shame, when a man is resolved not to
assent to what is manifest nor to desist from contradictions. Most
of us are afraid of mortification of the body, and would contrive
all means to avoid such a thing, but we care not about the soul's
mortification. And indeed with regard to the soul, if a man be in such
a state as not to apprehend anything, or understand at all, we think
that he is in a bad condition: but if the sense of shame and modesty
are deadened, this we call even power.
Do you comprehend that you are awake? "I do not," the man replies,
"for I do not even comprehend when in my sleep I imagine that I am
awake." Does this appearance then not differ from the other? "Not at
all," he replies. Shall I still argue with this man? And what fire
or what iron shall I apply to him to make him feel that he is
deadened? He does perceive, but he pretends that he does not. He's
even worse than a dead man. He does not see the contradiction: he is
in a bad condition. Another does see it, but he is not moved, and
makes no improvement: he is even in a worse condition. His modesty
is extirpated, and his sense of shame; and the rational faculty has
not been cut off from him, but it is brutalized. Shall I name this
strength of mind? Certainly not, unless we also name it such in
catamites, through which they do and say in public whatever comes into
their head.

CHAPTER 6

Of providence

From everything which is or happens in the world, it is easy to
praise Providence, if a man possesses these two qualities, the faculty
of seeing what belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a
grateful disposition. If he does not possess these two qualities,
one man will not see the use of things which are and which happen;
another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If
God had made colours, but had not made the faculty of seeing them,
what would have been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if
He had made the faculty of vision, but had not made objects such as to
fall under the faculty, what in that case also would have been the use