interprets the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and
much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of
Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that we may understand
nature. Nor do we need a diviner on his own account, but because we
think that through him we shall know the future and understand the
signs given by the gods; nor do we need the viscera of animals for
their own sake, but because through them signs are given; nor do we
look with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through them
gives signs?
I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacrificer, and
I say, "Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what signs they give."
The man takes the viscera, opens them, and interprets them: "Man,"
he says, "you have a will free by nature from hindrance and
compulsion; this is written here in the viscera. I will show you
this first in the matter of assent. Can any man hinder you from
assenting to the truth? No man can. Can any man compel you to
receive what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter you
have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from
compulsion, unimpeded." Well, then, in the matter of desire and
pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can overcome pursuit
except another pursuit? And what can overcome desire and aversion
except another desire and aversion? But, you object: "If you place
before me the fear of death, you do compel me." No, it is not what
is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is
better to do so-and-so than to die. In this matter, then, it is your
opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will. For if God
had made that part of Himself, which He took from Himself and gave
to us, of such a nature as to be hindered or compelled either by
Himself or by another, He would not then be God nor would He be taking
care of us as He ought. "This," says the diviner, "I find in the
victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you
choose, you are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will
charge no one. All will be at the same time according to your mind and
the mind of God." For the sake of this divination I go to this diviner
and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this interpretation,
but admiring the things which he interprets.

CHAPTER 18

That we ought not to he angry with the errors of others

If what philosophers say is true, that all men have one principle,
as in the case of assent the persuasion that a thing is so, and in the
case of dissent the persuasion that a thing is not so, and in the case
of a suspense of judgment the persuasion that a thing is uncertain, so
also in the case of a movement toward anything the persuasion that a
thing is for a man's advantage, and it is impossible to think that one
thing is advantageous and to desire another, and to judge one thing to
be proper and to move toward another, why then are we angry with the
many? "They are thieves and robbers," you may say. What do you mean by