labor and study." Well then do you expect to acquire the greatest of
arts with small labor? And yet the chief doctrine of philosophers is
brief. If you would know, read Zeno's writings and you will see. For
how few words it requires to say man's end is to follow the god's, and
that the nature of good is a proper use of appearances. But if you say
"What is 'God,' what is 'appearance,' and what is 'particular' and
what is 'universal nature'? then indeed many words are necessary. If
then Epicures should come and say that the good must be in the body;
in this case also many words become necessary, and we must be taught
what is the leading principle in us, and the fundamental and the
substantial; and as it is not probable that the good of a snail is
in the shell, is it probable that the good of a man is in the body?
But you yourself, Epicurus, possess something better than this. What
is that in you which deliberates, what is that which examines
everything, what is that which forms a judgement about the body
itself, that it is the principle part? and why do you light your
lamp and labor for us, and write so many books? is it that we may
not be ignorant of the truth, who we are, and what we are with respect
to you? Thus the discussion requires many words.

CHAPTER 21

Against those who wish to be admired

When a man holds his proper station in life, he does not gape
after things beyond it. Man, what do you wish to happen to you? "I
am satisfied if I desire and avoid conformably to nature, if I
employ movements toward and from an object as I am by nature formed to
do, and purpose and design and assent." Why then do you strut before
us as if you had swallowed a spit? "My wish has always been that those
who meet me should admire me, and those who follow me should
exclaim, 'Oh, the great philosopher.'" Who are they by whom you wish
to be admired? Are they not those of whom you are used to say that
they are mad? Well then do you wish to be admired by madmen?

CHAPTER 22

On precognitions

Precognitions are common to all men, and precognition is not
contradictory to precognition. For who of us does not assume that Good
is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to
follow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that justice is
beautiful and becoming? When, then, does the contradiction arise? It
arises in the adaptation of the precognitions to the particular cases.
When one man says, "He has done well: he is a brave man," and
another says, "Not so; but he has acted foolishly"; then the
disputes arise among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the
Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness
should be preferred to all things and in all cases should be