Discourses - Book II   

that you properly adapt the preconceptions to the particulars, tell me
whence you derive this. Because I think so. But it does not seem so to
another, and he thinks that he also makes a proper adaptation; or does
he not think so? He does think so. Is it possible then that both of
you can properly apply the preconceptions to things about which you
have contrary opinions? It is not possible. Can you then show us
anything better toward adapting the preconceptions beyond your
thinking that you do? Does the madman do any other things than the
things as in which seem to him right? Is then this criterion for him
also? It is not sufficient. Come then to something which is superior
to seeming. What is this?
Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of the
disagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of
the disagreement, and a condemnation and distrust of that which only
"seems," and a certain investigation of that which "seems" whether
it "seems" rightly, and a discovery of some rule, as we have
discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and a
carpenter's rule in the case of straight and crooked things. This is
the beginning of philosophy. "Must we say that all thins are right
which seem so to all?" And how is it possible that contradictions
can be right? "Not all then, but all which seem to us to be right."
How more to you than those which seem right to the Syrians? why more
than what seem right to the Egyptians? why more than what seems
right to me or to any other man? "Not at all more." What then
"seems" to every man is not sufficient for determining what "is";
for neither in the case of weights or measures are we satisfied with
the bare appearance, but in each case we have discovered a certain
rule. In this matter then is there no rule certain to what "seems?"
And how is it possible that the most necessary things among men should
have no sign, and be incapable of being discovered? There is then some
rule. And why then do we not seek the rule and discover it, and
afterward use it without varying from it, not even stretching out
the finger without it? For this, I think, is that which when it is
discovered cures of their madness those who use mere "seeming" as a
measure, and misuse it; so that for the future proceeding from certain
things known and made clear we may use in the case of particular
things the preconceptions which are distinctly fixed.
What is the matter presented to us about which we are inquiring?
"Pleasure." Subject it to the rule, throw it into the balance. Ought
the good to be such a thing that it is fit that we have confidence
in it? "Yes." And in which we ought to confide? "It ought to be." Is
it fit to trust to anything which is insecure? "No." Is then
pleasure anything secure? "No." Take it then and throw it out of the
scale, and drive it far away from the place of good things. But if you
are not sharp-sighted, and one balance is not enough for you, bring
another. Is it fit to be elated over what is good? "Yes." Is it proper
then to be elated over present pleasure? See that you do not say
that it is proper; but if you do, I shall then not think you are
worthy even of the balance. Thus things are tested and weighed when
the rules are ready. And to philosophize is this, to examine and