except so far as to appear to possess it. For what is the difference
between explaining these doctrines and those of men who have different
opinions? Sit down now and explain according to the rules of art the
opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps you will explain his opinions in a
more useful manner than Epicurus himself. Why then do you call
yourself a Stoic? Why do you deceive the many? Why do you deceive
the many? Why do you act the part of a Jew, when you are a Greek? Do
you not see how each is called a Jew, or a Syrian or an Egyptian?
and when we see a man inclining to two sides, we are accustomed to
say, "This man is not a Jew, but he acts as one." But when he has
assumed the affects of one who has been imbued with Jewish doctrine
and has adopted that sect, then he is in fact and he is named a Jew.
Thus we too being falsely imbued, are in name Jews, but in fact we are
something else. Our affects are inconsistent with our words; we are
far from practicing what we say, and that of which we are proud, as if
we knew it. Thus being, unable to fulfill even what the character of a
man promises, we even add to it the profession of a philosopher, which
is as heavy a burden, as if a man who is unable to bear ten pounds
should attempt to raise the stone which Ajax lifted.

CHAPTER 10

How we may discover the duties of life from names

Consider who you are. In the first place, you are a man; and this is
one who has nothing superior to the faculty of the will, but all other
things subjected to it; and the faculty itself he possesses unenslaved
and free from subjection. Consider then from what things you have been
separated by reason. You have been separated from wild beasts: you
have been separated from domestic animals. Further, you are a
citizen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient,
but one of the principal parts, for you are capable of comprehending
the divine administration and of considering the connection of things.
What then does the character of a citizen promise? To hold nothing
as profitable to himself; to deliberate about nothing as if he were
detached from the community, but to act as the hand or foot would
do, if they had reason and understood the constitution of nature,
for they would never put themselves in motion nor desire anything,
otherwise than with reference to the whole. Therefore the philosophers
say well, that if the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen,
he would cooperate toward his own sickness and death and mutilation,
since he knows that these things are assigned to him according to
the universal arrangement, and that the whole is superior to the
part and the state to the citizen. But now, because we do not know the
future, it is our duty to stick to the things which are in their
nature more suitable for our choice, for we were made among other
things for this.
After this, remember that you are a son. What does this character
promise? To consider that everything which is the son's belongs to the
father, to obey him in all things, never to blame him to another,