reason. For it is either through my fault that you do not finish it,
or through your own fault, or through the nature of the thing. The
thing itself is possible, and the only thing in our power. It
remains then that the fault is either in me or in you, or, what is
nearer the truth, in both. Well then, are you willing that we begin at
last to bring such a purpose into this school, and to take no notice
of the past? Let us only make a beginning. Trust to me, and you will
see.

CHAPTER 20

Against the Epicureans and Academics

The propositions which are true and evident are of necessity used
even by those who contradict them: and a man might perhaps consider it
to be the greatest proof of a thing being evident that it is found
to be necessary even for him who denies it to make use of it at the
same time. For instance, if a man should deny that there is anything
universally true, it is plain that he must make the contradictory
negation, that nothing is universally true. What, wretch, do you not
admit even this? For what else is this than to affirm that whatever is
universally affirmed is false? Again, if a man should come forward and
say: "Know that there is nothing that can be known, but all things are
incapable of sure evidence"; or if another say, "Believe me and you
will be the better for it, that a man ought not to believe
anything"; or again, if another should say, "Learn from me, man,
that it is not possible to learn anything; I tell you this and will
teach you, if you choose." Now in what respect do these differ from
those? Whom shall I name? Those who call themselves Academics? "Men,
agree that no man agrees: believe us that no man believes anybody."
Thus Epicurus also, when he designs to destroy the natural
fellowship of mankind, at the same time makes use of that which he
destroys. For what does he say? "Be not deceived men, nor be led
astray, nor be mistaken: there is no natural fellowship among rational
animals; believe me. But those who say otherwise, deceive you and
seduce you by false reasons." What is this to you? Permit us to be
deceived. Will you fare worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded
that there is a natural fellowship among us, and that it ought by
all means to be preserved? Nay, it will be much better and safer for
you. Man, why do you trouble yourself about us? Why do you keep
awake for us? Why do you light your lamp? Why do you rise early? Why
do you write so many books, that no one of us may be deceived about
the gods and believe that they take care of men; or that no one may
suppose the nature of good to be other than pleasure? For if this is
so, lie down and sleep, and lead the life of a worm, of which you
judged yourself worthy: eat and drink, and enjoy women, and ease
yourself, and snore. And what is it to you, how the rest shall think
about these things, whether right or wrong? For what have we to do
with you? You take care of sheep because they supply us with wool, and
milk, and, last of all, with their flesh. Would it not be a