judges that his case was just, said, when he had come to the
peroration of his speech, "I will neither entreat you nor do I care
what wi judgment you will give, and it is you rather than I who are on
your trial." And thus he ended the business. What need was there of
this? Only do not entreat; but do not also say, "I. do not entreat";
unless there is a fit occasion to irritate purposely the judges, as
was the case with Socrates. And you, if you are preparing such a
peroration, why do you wait, why do you obey the order to submit to
trial? For if you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will
come: but if you choose to submit and to plead your cause as well as
you can, you must do what is consistent with this object, provided you
maintain what is your own.
For this reason also it is ridiculous to say, "Suggest something
to me." What should I suggest to you? "Well, form my mind so as to
accommodate itself to any event." Why that is just the same as if a
man who is ignorant of letters should say, "Tell me what to write when
any name is proposed to me." For if I should tell him to write Dion,
and then another should come and propose to him not the name of Dion
but that of Theon, what will be done? what will he write? But if you
behave practiced writing, you are also prepared to write anything that
is required. If you are not, what. can I now suggest? For if
circumstances require something else, what will you say or what will
you do? Remember, then, this general precept and you will need no
suggestion. But if you gape after externals, you must of necessity
ramble up and down in obedience to the will of your master. And who is
the master? He who has the power over the things which you seek to
gain or try to avoid.

CHAPTER 3

To those who recommend persons to philosophers

Diogenes said well to one who asked from him letters of
recommendation, "That you are a man he said, "he will know as soon
as he sees you; and he will know whether you are good or bad, if he is
by experience skillful to distinguish the good and the bad; but if
he is without experience, he will never know, if I write to him ten
thousand times." For it is just the same as if a drachma asked to be
recommended to a person to be tested. If he is skillful in testing
silver, he will know what you are, for you will recommend yourself. We
ought then in life also to have some skill as in the case of silver
coin that a man may be able to say, like the judge of silver, "Bring
me any drachma and I will test it." But in the case of syllogisms I
would say, "Bring any man that you please, and I will distinguish
for you the man who knows how to resolve syllogisms and the man who
does not." Why? Because I know how to resolve syllogisms. I have the
power, which a man must have who is able to discover those who have
the power of resolving syllogisms. But in life how do I act? At one
time I call a thing good, and at another time bad. What is the reason?
The contrary to that which is in the case of syllogisms, ignorance and