Discourses - Book III   

ought to exercise ourselves daily against appearances; for these
appearances also propose questions to us. "A certain person son is
dead." Answer: the thing is not within the power of the will: it is
not an evil. "A father has disinherited a certain son. What do you
think of it?" It is a thing beyond the power of the will, not an evil.
"Caesar has condemned a person." It is a thing beyond the power of the
will, not an evil. "The man is afflicted at this." Affliction is a
thing which depends on the will: it is an evil. He has borne the
condemnation bravely." That is a thing within the power of the will:
it is a good. If we train ourselves in this manner, we shall make
progress; for we shall never assent to anything of which there is
not an appearance capable of being comprehended. Your son is dead.
What has happened? Your son is dead. Nothing more? Nothing. Your
ship is lost. What has happened? Your ship is lost. A man has been led
to prison. What has happened? He has been led to prison. But that
herein he has fared badly, every man adds from his own opinion. "But
Zeus," you say, "does not do right in these matters." Why? because
he has made you capable of endurance? because he has made you
magnanimous? because he has taken from that which befalls you the
power of being evil? because it is in your power to be happy while you
are suffering what you suffer; because he has opened the door to
you, when things do not please you? Man, go out and do not complain.
Hear how the Romans feel toward philosophers, if you would like to
know. Italicus, who was the most in repute of the philosophers, once
when I was present being, vexed with his own friends and as if he
was suffering something intolerable said, "I cannot bear it, you are
killing me: you will make me such as that man is"; pointing to me.

CHAPTER 9

To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a suit

When a certain person came to him, who was going up to Rome on
account of a suit which had regard to his rank, Epictetus inquired the
reason of his going to Rome, and the man then asked what he thought
about the matter. Epictetus replied: If you ask me what you will do in
Rome, whether you will succeed or fall, I have no rule about this. But
if you ask me how you will fare, I can tell you: if you have right
opinions, you will fare well; if they are false, you will fare ill.
For to every man the cause of his acting is opinion. For what is the
reason why you desired to be elected governor of the Cnossians? Your
opinion. What is the reason that you are now going up to Rome? Your
opinion. And going in winter, and with danger and expense. "I must
go." What tells you this? Your opinion. Then if opinions are the
causes of all actions, and a man has bad opinions, such as the cause
may be, such also is the effect. Have we then all sound opinions, both
you and your adversary? And how do you differ? But have you sounder
opinions than your adversary? Why? You think so. And so does he
think that his opinions are better; and so do madmen. This is a bad
criterion. But show to me that you have made some inquiry into your