Discourses - Book III   

There are certain penalties fixed as by law for those who disobey
the divine administration. Whoever thinks any other thing to be good
except those things which depend on the will, let him envy, let him
desire, let him flatter, let him be perturbed: whoever considers
anything else to be evil, let him grieve, let him lament, let him
weep, let him be unhappy. And yet, though so severely punished, we
cannot desist.
Remember what the poet says about the stranger:

Stranger, I must not, e'en if a worse man come.

This, then, may be applied even to a father: "I must not, even if a
worse man than you should come, treat a father unworthily-, for all
are from paternal Zeus." And of a brother, "For all are from the
Zeus who presides over kindred." And so in the other relations of life
we shall find Zeus to be an inspector.

CHAPTER 12

About exercise

We ought not to make our exercises consist in means contrary to
nature and adapted to cause admiration, for, if we do so, we, who call
ourselves philosophers, shall not differ at all from jugglers. For
it is difficult even to walk on a rope; and not only difficult, but it
is also dangerous. Ought we for this reason to practice walking on a
rope, or setting up a palm tree, or embracing statues? By no means.
Everything, which is difficult and dangerous is not suitable for
practice; but that is suitable which conduces to the working out of
that which is proposed to us as a thing to be worked out. To live with
desire and aversion, free from restraint. And what is this? Neither to
be disappointed in that which you desire, nor to fall into anything
which you would avoid. Toward this object, then, exercise ought to
tend. For, since it is not possible to have your desire not
disappointed and your aversion free from falling into that which you
would avoid, great and constant practice you must know that if you
allow your desire and aversion to turn to things which are not
within the power of the will, you will neither have your desire
capable of attaining your object, nor your aversion free from the
power of avoiding that which you would avoid. And since strong habit
leads, and we are accustomed to employ desire and aversion only to
things which are not within the power of our will, we ought to
oppose to this habit a contrary habit, and where there is great
slipperiness in the appearances, there to oppose the habit of
exercise.
I am rather inclined to pleasure: I will incline to the contrary
side above measure for the sake of exercise. I am averse to pain: I
will rub and exercise against this the appearances which are presented
to me for the purpose of withdrawing my aversion from every such