Discourses - Book IV   

that there is only one way which leads to this end, to give up the
things which do not depend on the will, to withdraw from them, and
to admit that they belong to others? For another man, then, to have an
opinion about you, of what kind is it? "It is a thing independent of
the will." Then is it nothing to you? "It is nothing." When, then, you
are still vexed at this and disturbed, do you think that you are
convinced about good and evil?
Will you not, then, letting others alone, be to yourself both
scholar and teacher? "The rest of mankind will look after this,
whether it is to their interest to be and to pass their lives in a
state contrary to nature: but to me no man is nearer than myself.
What, then, is the meaning of this, that I have listened to the
words of the philosophers and I assent to them, but in fact I am no
way made easier? Am I so stupid? And yet, in all other things such
as I have chosen, I have not been found very stupid; but I learned
letters quickly, and to wrestle, and geometry, and to resolve
syllogisms. Has not, then, reason convinced me? and indeed no other
things have I from the beginning so approved and chosen: and now I
read about these things, hear about them, write about them; I have
so far discovered no reason stronger than this. In what, then, am I
deficient? Have the contrary opinions not been eradicated from me?
Have the notions themselves not been exercised nor used to be
applied to action, but as armour are laid aside and rusted and
cannot fit me? And yet neither in the exercises of the palaestra,
nor in writing or reading am I satisfied with learning, but I turn
up and down the syllogisms which are proposed, and I make others,
and sophistical syllogisms also. But the necessary theorems, by
proceeding from which a man can become free from grief, fear,
passions, hindrance, and a free man, these I do not exercise myself in
nor do I practice in these the proper practice. Then I care about what
others will say of me, whether I shall appear to them worth notice,
whether I shall appear happy."
Wretched man, will you not see what you. are saying about
yourself? What do you appear to yourself to be? in your opinions, in
your desires, in your aversions from things, in your movements, in
your preparation, in your designs, and in other acts suitable to a
man? But do you trouble yourself about this, whether others pity
you? "Yes, but I am pitied not as I ought to be." Are you then
pained at this? and is he who is pained, an object of pity? "Yes."
How, then, are you pitied not as you ought to be? For by the very
act that you feel about being pitied, you make yourself deserving of
pity. What then says Antisthenes? Have you not heard? "It is a royal
thing, O Cyrus, to do right and to be ill-spoken of." My head is
sound, and all think that I have the headache. What do I care for
that? I am free from fever, and people sympathize with me as if I
had a fever: "Poor man, for so long a time you have not ceased to have
fever." I also say with a sorrowful countenance: "In truth it is now a
long time that I have been ill." "What will happen then?" "As God
may please": and at the same time I secretly laugh at those who are
pitying me. What, then, hinders the same being done in this case also?