Well then let us recapitulate the things which have been agreed
on. The man who is not under restraint is free, to whom things are
exactly in that state in which he wishes them to be; but he who can be
restrained or compelled or hindered, or thrown into any
circumstances against his will, is a slave. But who is free from
restraint? He who desires nothing that belongs to others. And what are
the things which belong to others? Those which are not in our power
either to have or not to have, or to have of a certain kind or in a
certain manner. Therefore the body belongs to another, the parts of
the body belong to another, possession belongs to another. If, then,
you are attached to any of these things as your own, you will pay
the penalty which it is proper for him to pay who desires what belongs
to another. This road leads to freedom, that is the only way of
escaping from slavery, to be able to say at last with all your soul

Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O destiny,
The way that I am bid by you to go.

But what do you say, philosopher? The tyrant summons you to say
something which does not become you. Do you say it or do you not?
Answer me. "Let me consider." Will you consider now? But when you were
in the school, what was it which you used to consider? Did you not
study what are the things that are good and what are bad, and what
things are neither one nor the other? "I did." What then was our
opinion? "That just and honourable acts were good; and that unjust and
disgraceful acts were bad." Is life a good thing? "No." Is death a bad
thing? "No." Is prison? "No." But what did we think about mean and
faithless words and betrayal of a friend and flattery of a tyrant?
"That they are bad." Well then, you are not considering, nor have
you considered nor deliberated. For what is the matter for
consideration: is it whether it is becoming for me, when I have it
in my power, to secure for myself the greatest of good things, and not
to secure for myself the greatest evils? A fine inquiry indeed, and
necessary, and one that demands much deliberation. Man, why do you
mock us? Such an inquiry is never made. If you really imagined that
base things were bad and honourable things were good, and that all
other things were neither good nor bad, you would not even have
approached this inquiry, nor have come near it; but immediately you
would have been able to distinguish them by the understanding as you
would do by the vision. For when do you inquire if black things are
white, if heavy things are light, and do not comprehend the manifest
evidence of the senses? How, then, do you now say that you are
considering whether things which are neither good nor bad ought to
be avoided more than things which are bad? But you do not possess
these opinions; and neither do these things seem to you to he
neither good nor bad, but you think that they are the greatest
evils; nor do you think those other things to be evils, but matters
which do not concern us at all. For thus from the beginning you have
accustomed yourself. "Where am I? In the schools: and are any
listening to me? I am discoursing among philosophers. But I have