to-morrow because you have behaved well in another. How much greater
is this a reason for making sacrifices than a consulship or the
government of a province? These things come to you from yourself and
from the gods. Remember this, Who gives these things and to whom,
and for what purpose. If you cherish yourself in these thoughts, do
you still think that it makes any difference where yon shall be happy,
where you shall please God? Are not the gods equally distant from
all places? Do they not see from all places alike that which is
going on?

CHAPTER 5

Against the quarrelsome and ferocious

The wise and good man neither himself fights with any person, nor
does he allow another, so far as he can prevent it. And an example
of this as well as of all other things is proposed to us in the life
of Socrates, who not only himself on all occasions avoided fights, but
would not allow even others to quarrel. See in Xenophon's Symposium
how many quarrels he settled; how further he endured Thrasymachus
and Polus and Callicles; how he tolerated his wife, and how he
tolerated his son who attempted to confute him aid to cavil with
him. For he remembered well that no man has in his power another man's
ruling principle. He wished, therefore nothing else than that which
was his own. And what is this? Not that this or that man may act
according to nature; for that is a thing which belongs to another; but
that while others are doing their own acts, as they choose, he may
never the less be in a condition conformable to nature and live in it,
only doing what is his own to the end that others also may be in a
state conformable to nature. For this is the object always set
before him by the wise and good man. Is it to be commander of an army?
No: but if it is permitted him, his object is in this matter to
maintain his own ruling principle. Is it to marry? No; but if marriage
is allowed to him, in this matter his object is to maintain himself in
a condition conformable to nature. But if he would have his son not to
do wrong, or his wife, he would have what belongs to another not to
belong to another; and to he instructed is this: to learn what
things are a man's own and what belongs to another.
How, then, is there left any place for fighting, to a man who has
this opinion? Is he surprised at anything which happens, and does it
appear new to him? Does he not expect that which comes from the bad to
be worse and more grievous than what actually befalls him? And does he
not reckon as pure gain whatever they may do which falls short of
extreme wickedness? "Such a person has reviled you." Great thanks to
him for not having, struck you. "But he has struck me also." Great
thanks that he did not wound you "But he wounded me also." Great
thanks that he did not kill you. For when did he learn or in what
school that man is a tame animal, that men love one another, that an
act of injustice is a great harm to him who does it. Since then he has
not to him who does it. Since then he has not learned this and is