of those who know not his art. "But they will be more hostile to me
for this reason." Why do you say "me"? Can any man injure your will,
or prevent you from using in a natural way the appearances which are
presented to you, "In no way can he." Why, then, are still disturbed
and why do you choose to show yourself afraid? And why do you not come
forth and proclaim that you are at peace with all men whatever they
may do, and laugh at those chiefly who think that they can harm you?
"These slaves," you can say, "know not either who I am nor where
lies my good or my evil, because they have no access to the things
which are mine."
In this way, also, those who occupy a strong city mock the
besiegers; "What trouble these men are now taking for nothing: our
wall is secure, we have food for a very long time, and all other
resources." These are the things which make a city strong and
impregnable: but nothing else than his opinions makes a man's soul
impregnable. For what wall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or
what possession is so safe, or what honour so free from assault? All
things everywhere are perishable, easily taken by assault, and, if any
man in any way is attached to them, he must be disturbed, expect
what is bad, he must fear, lament, find his desires disappointed,
and fall into things which he would avoid. Then do we not choose to
make secure the only means of safety which are offered to us, and do
we not choose to withdraw ourselves from that which is perishable
and servile and to labour at the things, which are imperishable and by
nature free; and do we not remember that no man either hurts another
or does good to another, but that a man's opinion about each thing
is that which hurts him, is that which overturns him; this is
fighting, this is civil discord, this is war? That which made Eteocles
and Polynices enemies was nothing else than this opinion which they
had about royal power, their opinion about exile, that the one is
the extreme of evils, the other the greatest good. Now this is the
nature of every man to seek the good, to avoid the bad; to consider
him who deprives us of the one and involves us in the other an enemy
and treacherous, even if he be a brother, or a son or a father. For
nothing is more akin to us than the good: therefore if these things
are good and evil, neither is a father a friend to sons, nor a brother
to a brother, but all the world is everywhere full of enemies,
treacherous men, and sycophants. But if the will, being what it
ought to be, is the only good; and if the will, being such as it ought
not to be, is the only evil, where is there any strife, where is there
reviling? about what? about the things which do not concern us? and
strife with whom? with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those who are
deceived about the chief things?
Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and endured a very
ill-tempered wife and a foolish son. For in what did she show her
bad temper? In pouring water on his head as much as she liked, and
in trampling on the cake. And what is this to me, if I think that
these things are nothing to me? But this is my business; and neither
tyrant shall check my will nor a master; nor shall the many check me
who am only one, nor shall the stronger check me who am the weaker;