possess them as no man else does; but you will have this such as you
choose to have it, sordid and neglected.

CHAPTER 8

Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philosophic
dress

Never praise nor blame a man because of the things which are common,
and do not ascribe to him any skill or want of skill; and thus you
will be free from rashness and from malevolence. "This man bathes very
quickly." Does he then do wrong? Certainly not. But what does he do?
He bathes very quickly. Are all things then done well? By no means:
but the acts which proceed from right opinions are done well; and
those which proceed from bad opinions are done ill. But do you,
until you know the opinion from which a man does each thing, neither
praise nor blame the act. But the opinion is not easily discovered
from the external things. "This man is a carpenter." Why? "Because
he uses an ax." What, then, is this to the matter? "This man is a
musician because he sings." And what does that signify? "This man is a
philosopher. Because he wears a cloak and long hair." And what does
a juggler wear? For this reason if a man sees any philosopher acting
indecently, immediately he says, "See what the philosopher is
doing"; but he ought because of the man's indecent behavior rather
to say that he is not a philosopher. For if this is the preconceived
notion of a philosopher and what he professes, to wear a cloak and
long hair, men would say well; but if what he professes is this
rather, to keep himself free from faults, why do we not rather,
because he does not make good his professions, take from him the
name of philosopher? For so we do in the case of all other arts.
When a man sees another handling an ax badly, he does not say, "What
is the use of the carpenter's art? See how badly carpenters do their
work"; but he says just the contrary, "This man is not a carpenter,
for he uses an ax badly." In the same way if a man hears another
singing badly, he does not say, "See how musicians sing"; but
rather, "This man is not a musician." But it is in the matter of
philosophy only that people do this. When they see a man acting
contrary to the profession of a philosopher, they do not take away his
title, but they assume him to be a philosopher, and from his acts
deriving the fact that he is behaving indecently they conclude that
there is no use in philosophy.
What, then, is the reason of this? Because we attach value to the
notion of a carpenter, and to that of a musician, and to the notion of
other artisans in like manner, but not to that of a philosopher, and
we judge from externals only that it is a thing confused and ill
defined. And what other kind of art has a name from the dress and
the hair; and has not theorems and a material and an end? What,
then, is the material of the philosopher? Is it a cloak? No, but
reason. What is his end? is it to wear a cloak? No, but to possess the
reason in a right state. Of what kind are his theorems? Are they those