The Enchiridion   

one, says nothing concerning himself as being anybody, or knowing
anything: when he is, in any instance, hindered or restrained, he
accuses himself; and, if he is praised, he secretly laughs at the
person who praises him; and, if he is censured, he makes no defense.
But he goes about with the caution of sick or injured people, dreading
to move anything that is set right, before it is perfectly fixed.
He suppresses all desire in himself; he transfers his aversion to
those things only which thwart the proper use of our own faculty of
choice; the exertion of his active powers towards anything is very
gentle; if he appears stupid or ignorant, he does not care, and, in
a word, he watches himself as an enemy, and one in ambush.
49. When anyone shows himself overly confident in ability to understand
and interpret the works of Chrysippus, say to yourself, " Unless Chrysippus
had written obscurely, this person would have had no subject for his
vanity. But what do I desire? To understand nature and follow her.
I ask, then, who interprets her, and, finding Chrysippus does, I have
recourse to him. I don't understand his writings. I seek, therefore,
one to interpret them." So far there is nothing to value myself upon.
And when I find an interpreter, what remains is to make use of his
instructions. This alone is the valuable thing. But, if I admire nothing
but merely the interpretation, what do I become more than a grammarian
instead of a philosopher? Except, indeed, that instead of Homer I
interpret Chrysippus. When anyone, therefore, desires me to read Chrysippus
to him, I rather blush when I cannot show my actions agreeable and
consonant to his discourse.
50. Whatever moral rules you have deliberately proposed to yourself.
abide by them as they were laws, and as if you would be guilty of
impiety by violating any of them. Don't regard what anyone says of
you, for this, after all, is no concern of yours. How long, then,
will you put off thinking yourself worthy of the highest improvements
and follow the distinctions of reason? You have received the philosophical
theorems, with which you ought to be familiar, and you have been familiar
with them. What other master, then, do you wait for, to throw upon
that the delay of reforming yourself? You are no longer a boy, but
a grown man. If, therefore, you will be negligent and slothful, and
always add procrastination to procrastination, purpose to purpose,
and fix day after day in which you will attend to yourself, you will
insensibly continue without proficiency, and, living and dying, persevere
in being one of the vulgar. This instant, then, think yourself worthy
of living as a man grown up, and a proficient. Let whatever appears
to be the best be to you an inviolable law. And if any instance of
pain or pleasure, or glory or disgrace, is set before you, remember
that now is the combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be put
off. By once being defeated and giving way, proficiency is lost, or
by the contrary preserved. Thus Socrates became perfect, improving
himself by everything. attending to nothing but reason. And though
you are not yet a Socrates, you ought, however, to live as one desirous
of becoming a Socrates.
51. The first and most necessary topic in philosophy is that of the
use of moral theorems, such as, "We ought not to lie;" the second