cratylus   

Hermogenes. Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the argument?
Cratylus. If you please.
Her. I should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus has
been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not
conventional; not a portion of the human voice which men agree to use;
but that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same
for Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own
name of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers "Yes." And
Socrates? "Yes." Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which
he is called. To this he replies- "If all the world were to call you
Hermogenes, that would not be your name." And when I am anxious to
have a further explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to
imply that he has a notion of his own about the matter, if he would
only tell, and could entirely convince me, if he chose to be
intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means; or rather
tell me, if you will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or
correctness of names, which I would far sooner hear.
Socrates. Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that "hard is
the knowledge of the good." And the knowledge of names is a great part
of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the
fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete
education in grammar and language- these are his own words- and then I
should have been at once able to answer your question about the
correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the
single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about
such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the
investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really
Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;- he means to
say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking
after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a
good deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we
had better leave the question open until we have heard both sides.
Her. I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and
others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of
correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name
which you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change
that and give another, the new name is as correct as the old- we
frequently change the names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name
is as good as the old: for there is no name given to anything by
nature; all is convention and habit of the users;- such is my view.
But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus,
or of any one else.
Soc. I dare say that you be right, Hermogenes: let us see;- Your
meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody
agrees to call it?
Her. That is my notion.
Soc. Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?
Her. Yes.
Soc. Well, now, let me take an instance;- suppose that I call a man a
horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly
called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the
rest of the world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by
me and a horse by the world:- that is your meaning?
Her. He would, according to my view.
Soc. But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is in
words a true and a false?
Her. Certainly.
Soc. And there are true and false propositions?
Her. To be sure.
Soc. And a true proposition says that which is, and a false
proposition says that which is not?
Her. Yes; what other answer is possible?
Soc. Then in a proposition there is a true and false?
Her. Certainly.