Soc. Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle
which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,- that of the Gods we know
nothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give
themselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call
themselves, whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of
all principles; and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we
will call them by any sort of kind names or patronymics which they
like, because we do not know of any other. That also, I think, is a
very good custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us,
then, if you please, in the first place announce to them that we are
not enquiring about them; we do not presume that we are able to do so;
but we are enquiring about the meaning of men in giving them these
names,- in this there can be small blame.
Her. I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like to
do as you say.
Soc. Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?
Her. Yes, that will be very proper.
Soc. What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?
Her. That is another and certainly a most difficult question.
Soc. My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have
been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good deal
to say.
Her. Well, and what of them?
Soc. They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of
names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still
discernible. For example, that which we term ousia is by some called
esia, and by others again osia. Now that the essence of things should
be called estia, which is akin to the first of these (esia = estia),
is rational enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling that
estia which participates in ousia. For in ancient times we too seem to
have said esia for ousia, and this you may note to have been the idea
of those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to
estia, which was natural enough if they meant that estia was the
essence of things. Those again who read osia seem to have inclined to
the opinion of Heracleitus, that all things flow and nothing stands;
with them the pushing principle (othoun) is the cause and ruling power
of all things, and is therefore rightly called osia. Enough of this,
which is all that we who know nothing can affirm. Next in order after
Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and Cronos, although the name of
Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare say that I am talking
great nonsense.
Her. Why, Socrates?
Soc. My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.
Her. Of what nature?
Soc. Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible.
Her. How plausible?
Soc. I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of
antiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer
also spoke.
Her. How do you mean?
Soc. Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and
nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says
that you cannot go into the same water twice.
Her. That is true.
Soc. Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the names
of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty much in
the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to
both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and,
as I believe, Hesiod also, tells of
Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys. And again, Orpheus says,
that
The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his
sister Tethys, who was his mother's daughter. You see that this is a
remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of Heracleitus.