better when in the form of gaia, for the earth may be truly called
"mother" (gaia, genneteira), as in the language of Homer (Od. ix. 118;
xiii. 160) gegaasi means gegennesthai.
Her. Good.
Soc. What shall we take next? Her. There are orai (the seasons), and
the two names of the year, eniautos and etos.
Soc. The orai should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to
know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the orai
because they divide (orizousin) the summers and winters and winds and
the fruits of the earth. The words eniautos and etos appear to be the
same,- "that which brings to light the plants and growths of the earth
in their turn, and passes them in review within itself (en eauto
exetazei)": this is broken up into two words, eniautos from en eauto,
and etos from etazei, just as the original name of Zeus was divided
into Zena and Dia; and the whole proposition means that his power of
reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two words etos and
eniautos being thus formed out of a single proposition.
Her. Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress.
Soc. I am run away with.
Her. Very true.
Soc. But am not yet at my utmost speed.
Her. I should like very much to know, in the next place, how you would
explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those
charming words- wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?
Soc. That is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring;
still, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be faint of heart;
and I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom (phronesis)
and understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome), and knowledge
(episteme), and all those other charming words, as you call them?
Her. Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning.
Soc. By the dog of Egypt I have not a bad notion which came into my
head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names
were undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in
their search after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from
constantly going round and round, and then they imagine that the world
is going round and round and moving in all directions; and this
appearance, which arises out of their own internal condition, they
suppose to be a reality of nature; they think that there is nothing
stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is
always full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of
the names which I mentioned has led me into making this reflection.
Her. How is that, Socrates?
Soc. Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been
just cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely
indicated.
Her. No, indeed, I never thought of it.
Soc. Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a
name indicative of motion.
Her. What was the name? Soc. Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify
Phoras kai rhou noesis (perception of motion and flux), or perhaps
Phoras onesis (the blessing of motion), but is at any rate connected
with Pheresthai (motion); gnome (judgment), again, certainly implies
the ponderation or consideration (nomesis) of generation, for to
ponder is the same as to consider; or, if you would rather, here is
noesis, the very word just now mentioned, which is neou esis (the
desire of the new); the word neos implies that the world is always in
process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express his
longing of the soul, for the original name was neoesis, and not
noesis. The word sophrosune is the salvation (soteria) of that wisdom
(phronesis) which we were just now considering. Epioteme (knowledge)
is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good for
anything follows (epetai) the motion of things, neither anticipating
them nor falling behind them; wherefor the word should rather be read
as epistemene, inserting en. Sunesis (understanding) may be regarded