crito   

depraved, which is improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice?
Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to
do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?
Cr. Certainly not.
Soc. More honored, then?
Cr. Far more honored.
Soc. Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us: but
what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will
say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error
when you suggest that we should regard the opinion of the many about
just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. Well,
someone will say, "But the many can kill us."
Cr. Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.
Soc. That is true; but still I find with surprise that the old
argument is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. And I should like to
know Whether I may say the same of another proposition- that not life,
but a good life, is to be chiefly valued?
Cr. Yes, that also remains.
Soc. And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable one- that
holds also?
Cr. Yes, that holds.
Soc. From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I
ought or ought not to try to escape without the consent of the
Athenians: and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the
attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations which
you mention, of money and loss of character, and the duty of educating
children, are, I fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would
be as ready to call people to life, if they were able, as they are to
put them to death- and with as little reason. But now, since the
argument has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains to be
considered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in
suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money and
thanks, or whether we shan not do rightly; and if the latter, then
death or any other calamity which may ensue on my remaining here must
not be allowed to enter into the calculation.
Cr. I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?
Soc. Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute me
if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend,
from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the
Athenians: for I am extremely desirous to be persuaded by you, but not
against my own better judgment. And now please to consider my first
position, and do your best to answer me.
Cr. I will do my best.
Soc. Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or
that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong,
or is doing wrong always evil and dishonorable, as I was just now
saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us? Are all our former
admissions which were made within a few days to be thrown away? And
have we, at our age, been earnestly discoursing with one another all
our life long only to discover that we are no better than children? Or
are we to rest assured, in spite of the opinion of the many, and in
spite of consequences whether better or worse, of the truth of what
was then said, that injustice is always an evil and dishonor to him
who acts unjustly? Shall we affirm that?
Cr. Yes.
Soc. Then we must do no wrong?
Cr. Certainly not.
Soc. Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imagine; for we
must injure no one at all?
Cr. Clearly not.
Soc. Again, Crito, may we do evil?
Cr. Surely not, Socrates.
Soc. And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality
of the many-is that just or not?