crito   

Cr. Not just.
Soc. For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?
Cr. Very true.
Soc. Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to anyone,
whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you
consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this
opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any
considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who
are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only
despise one another, when they see how widely they differ. Tell me,
then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that
neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever
right. And shall that be the premise of our agreement? Or do you
decline and dissent from this? For this has been of old and is still
my opinion; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you
have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as formerly, I
will proceed to the next step.
Cr. You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.
Soc. Then I will proceed to the next step, which may be put in the
form of a question: Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or
ought he to betray the right?
Cr. He ought to do what he thinks right.
Soc. But if this is true, what is the application? In leaving the
prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or rather do
I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert the
principles which were acknowledged by us to be just? What do you say?
Cr. I cannot tell, Socrates, for I do not know.
Soc. Then consider the matter in this way: Imagine that I am about to
play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you like),
and the laws and the government come and interrogate me: "Tell us,
Socrates," they say; "what are you about? are you going by an act of
yours to overturn us- the laws and the whole State, as far as in you
lies? Do you imagine that a State can subsist and not be overthrown,
in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and
overthrown by individuals?" What will be our answer, Crito, to these
and the like words? Anyone, and especially a clever rhetorician, will
have a good deal to urge about the evil of setting aside the law which
requires a sentence to be carried out; and we might reply, "Yes; but
the State has injured us and given an unjust sentence." Suppose I say
that?
Cr. Very good, Socrates.
Soc. "And was that our agreement with you?" the law would sar, "or
were you to abide by the sentence of the State?" And if I were to
express astonishment at their saying this, the law would probably add:
"Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes: you are in the habit
of asking and answering questions. Tell us what complaint you have to
make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and
the State? In the first place did we not bring you into existence?
Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether
you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate
marriage?" None, I should reply. "Or against those of us who regulate
the system of nurture and education of children in which you were
trained? Were not the laws, who have the charge of this, right in
commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?" Right, I
should reply. "Well, then, since you were brought into the world and
nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you
are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this
is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that you
have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any
right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or to your
master, if you had one, when you have been struck or reviled by him,
or received some other evil at his hands?- you would not say this? And
because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any
right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies?