euthydemus   

correct use of terms. The two foreign gentlemen, perceiving that you
did not know, wanted to explain to you that the word "to learn" has
two meanings, and is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge
of some matter of which you previously have no knowledge, and also,
when you have the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter,
whether something done or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired
knowledge; the latter is generally called "knowing" rather than
"learning," but the word "learning" is also used; and you did not see,
as they explained to you, that the term is employed of two opposite
sorts of men, of those who know, and of those who do not know. There
was a similar trick in the second question, when they asked you
whether men learn what they know or what they do not know. These parts
of learning are not serious, and therefore I say that the gentlemen
are not serious, but are only playing with you. For if a man had all
that sort of knowledge that ever was, he would not be at all the
wiser; he would only be able to play with men, tripping them up and
over setting them with distinctions of words. He would be like a
person who pulls away a stool from some one when he is about to sit
down, and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of his friend
overturned and laid on his back. And you must regard all that has
hitherto passed between you and them as merely play. But in what is to
follow I am certain that they will exhibit to you their serious
purpose, and keep their promise (I will show them how); for they
promised to give me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, but I
suppose that they wanted to have a game with you first. And now,
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I think that we have had enough of this.
Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply
himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you
what I conceive to be the nature of the task, and what sort of a
discourse I desire to hear; and if I do this in a very inartistic and
ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me, for I only venture to improvise
before you because I am eager to hear your wisdom: and I must
therefore ask you and your disciples to refrain from laughing. And
now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you: Do not all men
desire happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one of those ridiculous
questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought not to be asked by
a sensible man: for what human being is there who does not desire
happiness?
There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not.
Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be
happy?-that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have
many good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question
than the first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.
He assented.
And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell
us this, which may be easily answered; for every one will say that
wealth is a good.
Certainly, he said.
And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?
He agreed.
Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in
one's own land, are goods?
He assented.
And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance,
justice, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that
we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking
them as goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What
then do you say?
They are goods, said Cleinias.
Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for
wisdom-among the goods or not?
Among the goods.
And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable
goods.