I do not think that we have, said Cleinias.
Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out
the greatest of them all.
What is that? he asked.
Fortune, Cleinias, I replied; which all, even the most foolish, admit
to be the greatest of goods.
True, he said.
On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you
and I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers.
Why do you say so?
Why, because we have already spoken of good-fortune, and are but
repeating ourselves.
What do you mean?
I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward
good-fortune, which has a place in the list already, and saying the
same thing twice over.
He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is
good-fortune; even a child may know that.
The simple-minded youth was amazed; and, observing his surprise, I
said to him: Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players are most
fortunate and successful in performing on the flute?
He assented.
And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters?
Certainly.
Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the
whole than wise pilots?
None, certainly.
And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take
the risk-in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?
With a wise one.
And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a
dangerous illness-a wise physician, or an ignorant one?
A wise one.
You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than
to act with an ignorant one?
He assented.
Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man would
ever err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom
would be wisdom no longer.
We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general
conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then
recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember,
I said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate
if many good things were present with us?
He assented.
And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if
they profited us not, or if they profited us?
If they profited us, he said.
And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them?
For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a
great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited?
Certainly not, he said.
Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his
work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of
them? For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all
his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked?
Certainly not, he said.
And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now
speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed
them?
No indeed, Socrates.
Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good
things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely
having them?