And that is impossible?
Impossible, he replied.
Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously
maintain no man to be ignorant?
Refute me, he said.
But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is
impossible?
Very true, said Euthydemus.
Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for
how can I tell you to do that which is not?
O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties
and excellent devices of wisdom; I am afraid that I hardly understand
them, and you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid
question: if there be no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance,
there can be no such thing as erroneous action, for a man cannot fail
of acting as he is acting-that is what you mean?
Yes, he replied.
And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such
thing as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of
goodness, do you come hither to teach? And were you not just now
saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was
willing to learn?
And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that
you bring up now what I said at first-and if I had said anything last
year, I suppose that you would bring that up too-but are non-plussed
at the words which I have just uttered?
Why, I said, they are not easy to answer; for they are the words of
wise men: and indeed I know not what to make of this word
"nonplussed," which you used last: what do you mean by it,
Dionysodorus? You must mean that I cannot refute your argument. Tell
me if the words have any other sense.
No, he replied, they mean what you say. And now answer.
What, before you, Dionysodorus? I said.
Answer, said he.
And is that fair?
Yes, quite fair, he said.
Upon what principle? I said. I can only suppose that you are a very
wise man who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who
knows when to answer and when not to answer-and now you will not open
your mouth at all, because you know that you ought not.
You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you
admit that I am wise, answer as I tell you.
I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the question.
Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless?
They are alive.
And do you know of any word which is alive?
I cannot say that I do.
Then why did you ask me what sense my words had?
Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was
right after all in saying that words have a sense;-what do you say,
wise man? If I was not in error, even you will not refute me, and all
your wisdom will be non-plussed; but if I did fall into error, then
again you are wrong in saying that there is no error,-and this remark
was made by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however,
Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument lies where it was and
is not very likely to advance: even your skill in the subtleties of
logic, which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing
another and not falling yourself, now any more than of old.
Ctesippus said: Men of Chios, Thurii, or however and whatever you call
yourselves, I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to
talking nonsense.
Fearing that there would be high words, I again endeavoured to soothe
Ctesippus, and said to him: To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I
said before to Cleinias-that you do not understand the ways of these