euthyphro   

will go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to you, I cannot
do better than repeat this challenge in the court.
Euth. Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am
mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great
deal more to say to him than to me.
Soc. And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming your
disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you- not even
this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has
indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the
nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and
of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is
not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again- is it
not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself,
having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?
Euth. To be sure, Socrates.
Soc. And what is piety, and what is impiety?
Euth. Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any
one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar
crime-whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be-that
makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. And please
to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of the
truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others:-of
the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not
to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most
righteous of the gods?-and yet they admit that he bound his father
(Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had
punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless
manner. And yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with
me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the gods are
concerned, and when I am concerned.
Soc. May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with
impiety-that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and
therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are
well informed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than
assent to your superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing as I
do, that I know nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus,
whether you really believe that they are true.
Euth. Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the
world is in ignorance.
Soc. And do you really believe that the gods, fought with one another,
and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as
you may see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are
full of them; and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried up to
the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are
all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?
Euth. Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you
would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would
quite amaze you.
Soc. I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I
have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more
precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the
question, What is "piety"? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you
do, charging your father with murder.
Euth. And what I said was true, Socrates.
Soc. No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many
other pious acts?
Euth. There are.
Soc. Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples
of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things
to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made
the impious impious, and the pious pious?
Euth. I remember.
Soc. Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a
standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions,