euthyphro   

whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to
say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.
Euth. I will tell you, if you like.
Soc. I should very much like.
Euth. Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is
that which is not dear to them.
Soc. Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer
which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as
yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of
your words.
Euth. Of course.
Soc. Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or
person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person
which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme
opposites of one another. Was not that said?
Euth. It was.
Soc. And well said?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.
Soc. And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities
and hatreds and differences?
Euth. Yes, that was also said.
Soc. And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for
example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do
differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with
one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to
them by a sum?
Euth. True.
Soc. Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end
the differences by measuring?
Euth. Very true.
Soc. And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a
weighing machine?
Euth. To be sure.
Soc. But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and
which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I
dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore
I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of
difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and
dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and
about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our
differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we
quarrel is such as you describe.
Soc. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur,
are of a like nature?
Euth. Certainly they are.
Soc. They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and
evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have
been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such
differences-would there now?
Euth. You are quite right.
Soc. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and
good, and hate the opposite of them?
Euth. Very true.
Soc. But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and
others as unjust,-about these they dispute; and so there arise wars
and fightings among them.
Euth. Very true.
Soc. Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods,
and are both hateful and dear to them?
Euth. True.
Soc. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and
also impious?
Euth. So I should suppose.