Soc. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not
answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you
to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would
seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And
therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very
likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos
or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to
Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of
opinion.
Euth. But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to
the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of
opinion about that.
Soc. Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one
arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?
Euth. I should rather say that these are the questions which they are
always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of
crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their
own defence.
Soc. But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they
ought not to be punished?
Euth. No; they do not.
Soc. Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and
do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be
unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished,
but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did
and when?
Euth. True.
Soc. And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel
about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that
injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever
venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?
Euth. That is true, Socrates, in the main.
Soc. But they join issue about the particulars-gods and men alike;
and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is
called in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by
others to be unjust. Is not that true?
Euth. Quite true.
Soc. Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better
instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion
of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in
chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in
chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the
gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf
of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse
him of murder. How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree
in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud
your wisdom as long as I live.
Euth. It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very
dear indeed to you.
Soc. I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of
apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that
the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.
Euth. Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.
Soc. But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good
speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were
speaking; I said to myself: "Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to
me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do
I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting
that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety
are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is
hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to
them." And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I