gorgias   

meaning of one another's words; I would have you develop your own

views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.

Gor. I think that you are quite right, Socrates.

Soc. Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as

"having learned"?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And there is also "having believed"?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And is the "having learned" the same "having believed," and are

learning and belief the same things?

Gor. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.

Soc. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this

way:-If a person were to say to you, "Is there, Gorgias, a false

belief as well as a true?" -you would reply, if I am not mistaken,

that there is.

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?

Gor. No.

Soc. No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief

differ.

Gor. Very true.

Soc. And yet those who have learned as well as those who have

believed are persuaded?

Gor. Just so.

Soc. Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,-one which is

the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?

Gor. By all means.

Soc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts

of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of

persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives

knowledge?

Gor. Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.