gorgias   

Gor. True.

Soc. And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric

treated of discourse, not [like arithmetic] about odd and even, but

about just and unjust? Was not this said?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that

rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not

possibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards,

that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with

surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that

if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted,

there would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not,

I would leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you

will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be

incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do

injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of

discussion, before we get at the truth of all this.

Polus. And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now

saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny

that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good,

and admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could

teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a

contradiction-the thing which you dearly love, and to which not he,

but you, brought the argument by your captious questions-[do you

seriously believe that there is any truth in all this?] For will any

one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the

nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners

in bringing the argument to such a pass.

Soc. Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with

friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger

generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and

in our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are