gorgias   

will it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that

which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why

are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?

Pol. You are right.

Soc. Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant

or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of

his property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests

when really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems

best to him?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do

you not answer?

Pol. Well, I suppose not.

Soc. Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one

have great power in a state?

Pol. He will not.

Soc. Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to

him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?

Pol. As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of

doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would

not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or

imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no!

Soc. Justly or unjustly, do you mean?

Pol. In either case is he not equally to be envied?

Soc. Forbear, Polus!

Pol. Why "forbear"?

Soc. Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be

envied, but only to pity them.

Pol. And are those of whom spoke wretches?

Soc. Yes, certainly they are.

Pol. And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and

justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?