gorgias   

Soc. No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is

to be envied.

Pol. Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?

Soc. Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he

is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him

justly.

Pol. At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death

is wretched, and to be pitied?

Soc. Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as

he who is justly killed.

Pol. How can that be, Socrates?

Soc. That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the

greatest of evils.

Pol. But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater

evil?

Soc. Certainly not.

Pol. Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?

Soc. I should not like either, but if I must choose between them,

I would rather suffer than do.

Pol. Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?

Soc. Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.

Pol. I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems

good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you

like.

Soc. Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do

you reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a

dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare

power, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men

whom you see ought to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to

kill is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or

tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn

in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do