gorgias   

not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply:

Socrates, in that sort of way any one may have great power-he may burn

any house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the

Athenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or

private-but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best

is great power?

Pol. Certainly not such doing as this.

Soc. But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?

Pol. I can.

Soc. Why then?

Pol. Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be

punished.

Soc. And punishment is an evil?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is

a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and

that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is

an evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another

way do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking,

the infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property

are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. About that you and I may be supposed to agree?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that

they are evil-what principle do you lay down?

Pol. I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask

that question.

Soc. Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me,

I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are

unjust.

Pol. You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child