gorgias   

Soc. But I say that this is an impossibility-here is one point about

which we are at issue:-very good. And do you mean to say also that

if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?

Pol. Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.

Soc. On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then,

according to you, he will be happy?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust

actions is miserable in any case,-more miserable, however, if he be

not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if

he be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and

men.

Pol. You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.

Soc. I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a

friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us-are

they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?

Pol. Exactly so.

Soc. And you said the opposite?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?

Pol. By Zeus, I did.

Soc. In your own opinion, Polus.

Pol. Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.

Soc. You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be

unpunished?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who

are punished are less miserable-are you going to refute this

proposition also?

Pol. A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other,

Socrates.

Soc. Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth?