gorgias   

the person with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take;

but with the many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself

to them. May I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have

your words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I and you

and every man do really believe, that to do is a greater evil than

to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to be punished.

Pol. And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself,

for example, suffer rather than do injustice?

Soc. Yes, and you, too; I or any man would.

Pol. Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.

Soc. But will you answer?

Pol. To be sure, I will-for I am curious to hear what you can have

to say.

Soc. Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I

am beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your

opinion, is the worst?-to do injustice or to suffer?

Pol. I should say that suffering was worst.

Soc. And which is the greater disgrace?-Answer.

Pol. To do.

Soc. And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?

Pol. Certainly not.

Soc. I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the

honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the

evil?

Pol. Certainly not.

Soc. Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful

things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you

not call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for

example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the

sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other

account of personal beauty?

Pol. I cannot.