gorgias   

Soc. And you would say of figures or colours generally that they

were beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or

of their use, or both?

Pol. Yes, I should.

Soc. And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same

reason?

Pol. I should.

Soc. Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in

so far as they are useful or pleasant or both?

Pol. I think not.

Soc. And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?

Pol. To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring

beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility.

Soc. And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the

opposite standard of pain and evil?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the

measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that

is to say, in pleasure or utility or both?

Pol. Very true.

Soc. And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity

or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil-must it not be so?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. But then again, what was the observation which you just now

made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering

wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?

Pol. I did.

Soc. Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the

more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in

evil or both: does not that also follow?

Pol. Of course.

Soc. First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice