gorgias   

exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer

more than the injured?

Pol. No, Socrates; certainly not.

Soc. Then they do not exceed in pain?

Pol. No.

Soc. But if not in pain, then not in both?

Pol. Certainly not.

Soc. Then they can only exceed in the other?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. That is to say, in evil?

Pol. True.

Soc. Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will

therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?

Pol. Clearly.

Soc. But have not you and the world already agreed that to do

injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And that is now discovered to be more evil?

Pol. True.

Soc. And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a

less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if

you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as

to a physician without shrinking, and either say "Yes" or "No" to me.

Pol. I should say "No."

Soc. Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?

Pol. No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.

Soc. Then I said truly, Polus that neither you, nor I, nor any

man, would rather, do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is

the greater evil of the two.

Pol. That is the conclusion.

Soc. You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of

refutations, how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of