laches,-or-courage   

things." But I must be allowed to add "of the good only." Socrates
must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I shall be a
dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the teacher is younger, or not as
yet in repute-anything of that sort is of no account with me. And
therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you may teach and confute
me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me anything which I
know. So high is the opinion which I have entertained of you ever
since the day on which you were my companion in danger, and gave a
proof of your valour such as only the man of merit can give.
Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind about the difference
of our ages.
Soc. I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take
counsel and advise with me.
Lys. But this is our proper business; and yours as well as ours, for I
reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find out
from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the
youths, and talk and consult with them: for I am old, and my memory is
bad; and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or
the answers to them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost.
I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by
yourselves; and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your
conclusions.
Soc. Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of Lysimachus
and Melesias. There will be no harm in asking ourselves the question
which was first proposed to us: "Who have been our own instructors in
this sort of training, and whom have we made better?" But the other
mode of carrying on the enquiry will bring us equally to the same
point, and will be more like proceeding from first principles. For if
we knew that the addition of something would improve some other thing,
and were able to make the addition, then, clearly, we must know how
that about which we are advising may be best and most easily attained.
Perhaps you do not understand what I mean. Then let me make my meaning
plainer in this way. Suppose we knew that the addition of sight makes
better the eyes which possess this gift, and also were able to impart
sight to the eyes, then, clearly, we should know the nature of sight,
and should be able to advise how this gift of sight may be best and
most easily attained; but if we knew neither what sight is, nor what
hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers about the eyes
or the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and hearing to
them.
La. That is true, Socrates.
Soc. And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment inviting
us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to their
sons for the improvement of their minds?
La. Very true.
Soc. Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how can we
advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we
are wholly ignorant?
La. I do not think that we can, Socrates.
Soc. Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue?
La. Yes.
Soc. And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?
La. Certainly.
Soc. I would not have us begin, my friend, with enquiring about the
whole of virtue; for that may be more than we can accomplish; let us
first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part; the
enquiry will thus probably be made easier to us.
La. Let us do as you say, Socrates.
Soc. Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we not
select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed to
conduce? And is not that generally thought to be courage?
La. Yes, certainly.
Soc. Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the
nature of courage, and in the second place proceed to enquire how the