laches,-or-courage   

that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all
the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain,
and in all the cases to which I was just now referring?
La. I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I
am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.
Soc. But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question. And
yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be
deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you would
consider courage to be a very noble quality.
La. Most noble, certainly.
Soc. And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?
La. Very noble.
Soc. But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on
the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?
La. True.
Soc. And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?
La. I ought not to say that, Socrates.
Soc. Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage-for
it is not noble, but courage is noble?
La. You are right.
Soc. Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?
La. True.
Soc. But as to the epithet "wise,"-wise in what? In all things small
as well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality of endurance
in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire
more in the end, do you call him courageous?
La. Assuredly not.
Soc. Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or some
patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he may be
allowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and refuses;
is that courage?
La. No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last.
Soc. Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willing to
fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him, and
that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there are
with him; and suppose that he has also advantages of position; would
you say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom and
preparation, that he, or some man in the opposing army who is in the
opposite circumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his
post, is the braver?
La. I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.
Soc. But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the
other?
La. That is true.
Soc. Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry
endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as
he who endures, having no such knowledge?
La. So I should say.
Soc. And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling,
or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who
endures, not having such a knowledge?
La. True.
Soc. And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in this
or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the like, is,
as you would say, more courageous than those who have this knowledge?
La. Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?
Soc. Nothing, if that be what he thinks.
La. But that is what I do think.
Soc. And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish, Laches, in
comparison of those who do the same things, having the skill to do
them.
La. That is true.
Soc. But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base and
hurtful to us.