laches,-or-courage   

us ask him just to explain what he means, and if he has reason on his
side we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.
La. Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have asked
enough.
Soc. I do not see why I should not; and my question will do for both
of us.
La. Very good.
Soc. Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I are
partners in the argument: Do you mean to affirm that courage is the
knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?
Nic. I do.
Soc. And not every man has this knowledge; the physician and the
soothsayer have it not; and they will not be courageous unless they
acquire it-that is what you were saying?
Nic. I was.
Soc. Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know, as
the proverb says, and therefore he could not be courageous.
Nic. I think not.
Soc. Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian
sow would be called by you courageous. And this I say not as a joke,
but because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that courage
is the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allow that
any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a
leopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has such a degree of
wisdom that he knows things which but a few human beings ever know by
reason of their difficulty. He who takes your view of courage must
affirm that a lion, and a stag, and a bull, and a monkey, have equally
little pretensions to courage.
La. Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good. And I hope,
Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all
admit to be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or whether you
will have the boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny
their courage.
Nic. Why, Laches, I do not call animals or any other things which have
no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, courageous, but
only fearless and senseless. Do you imagine that I should call little
children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none?
There is a difference, to my way of thinking, between fearlessness and
courage. I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality
possessed by very few, but that rashness and boldness, and
fearlessness, which has no forethought, are very common qualities
possessed by many men, many women, many children, many animals. And
you, and men in general, call by the term "courageous" actions which I
call rash;-my courageous actions are wise actions.
La. Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses himself
out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honour of courage those
whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous.
Nic. Not so, Laches, but do not be alarmed; for I am quite willing to
say of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that you
are courageous and therefore wise.
La. I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeth
that I am a haughty Aexonian.
Soc. Do not answer him, Laches; I rather fancy that you are not aware
of the source from which his wisdom is derived. He has got all this
from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of all
the Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words
of this sort.
La. Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a much more
suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the
city chooses to preside over her.
Soc. Yes, my sweet friend, but a great statesman is likely to have a
great intelligence. And I think that the view which is implied in
Nicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination.
La. Then examine for yourself, Socrates.