Nic. That, as I suppose, is true.
Soc. Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a
third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature
of courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your
present view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the
fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without
reference to time. What do you say to that alteration in your
statement?
Nic. I agree, Socrates.
Soc. But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and
how. they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be
perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or
holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were
dangers' and which were not, and guard against them whether they were
supernatural or natural; and he would provide the good, as he would
know how to deal both with gods or men.
Nic. I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what
you say.
Soc. But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of
yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?
Nic. It would seem so.
Soc. But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?
Nic. Yes, that was what we were saying.
Soc. And that is in contradiction with our present view?
Nic. That appears to be the case.
Soc. Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is.
Nic. We have not.
La. And yet, friend Nicias,l imagined that you would have made the
discovery, when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made
to Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been
enlightened by the wisdom of Damon.
Nic. I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayed
your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see
whether I have not made a similar display; and if we are both equally
ignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything should
know, that, I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly appear
to me very like the rest of the world, looking at your neighbour and
not at yourself. I am of opinion that enough has been said on the
subject which we have been discussing; and if anything has been
imperfectly said, that may be hereafter corrected by the help of
Damon, whom you think to laugh down, although you have never seen him,
and with the help of others. And when I am satisfied myself, I will
freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I think that you are very
much in want of knowledge.
La. You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware: nevertheless I
would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you and me as
advisers about the education of their children; but, as I said at
first, they should ask Socrates and not let him off; if my own sons
were old enough, I would have asked him myself.
Nic. To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them under
his charge. I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor of
Niceratus. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he
recommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he may
be more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus.
Lys. He ought, Nicias: for certainly I would do things for him which I
would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates-will you
comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the
youths?
Soc. Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid in
the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation
that I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit
that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but as we
are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred to
another? I certainly think that no one should; and under these