lysis,-or-friendship   

possessions to you.
I think so.
Aye, I said; and about your neighbour, too, does not the same rule
hold as about your father? If he is satisfied that you know more of
housekeeping than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs
himself, or will he commit them to you?
I think that he will commit them to me.
Will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when
they see that you have wisdom enough to manage them?
Yes.
And oh! let me put another case, I said: There is the great king, and
he has an eldest son, who is the Prince of Asia;-suppose that you and
I go to him and establish to his satisfaction that we are better cooks
than his son, will he not entrust to us the prerogative of making
soup, and putting in anything that we like while the pot is boiling,
rather than to the Prince of Asia, who is his son?
To us, clearly.
And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls, whereas the son
will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his
fingers?
Of course.
Or suppose again that the son has bad eyes, will he allow him, or will
he not allow him, to touch his own eyes if he thinks that he has no
knowledge of medicine?
He will not allow him.
Whereas, if he supposes us to have a knowledge of medicine, he will
allow us to do what we like with him-even to open the eyes wide and
sprinkle ashes upon them, because he supposes that we know what is
best?
That is true.
And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or
his son he will commit to us?
That is very true, Socrates, he replied.
Then now, my dear Lysis, I said, you perceive that in things which we
know every one will trust us-Hellenes and barbarians, men and
women-and we may do as we please about them, and no one will like to
interfere with us; we shall be free, and masters of others; and these
things will be really ours, for we shall be benefited by them. But in
things of which we have no understanding, no one will trust us to do
as seems good to us-they will hinder us as far as they can; and not
only strangers, but father and mother, and the friend, if there be
one, who is dearer still, will also hinder us; and we shall be subject
to others; and these things will not be ours, for we shall not be
benefited by them. Do you agree?
He assented.
And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in as
far as we are useless to them?
Certainly not.
Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anybody love
anybody else, in so far as they are useless to them?
No.
And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, -all men will be your friends
and kindred, for you will be useful and good; but if you are not wise,
neither father, nor mother, nor kindred, nor any one else, will be
your friends. And in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge,
can you have any conceit of knowledge?
That is impossible, he replied.
And you, Lysis, if you require a teacher, have not yet attained to
wisdom.
True.
And therefore you are not conceited, having nothing of which to be
conceited.
Indeed, Socrates, I think not.
When I heard him say this, I turned to Hippothales, and was very