lysis,-or-friendship   

to give Menexenus a rest, so I turned to him and said, I think, Lysis,
that what you say is true, and that, if we had been right, we should
never have gone so far wrong; let us proceed no further in this
direction (for the road seems to be getting troublesome), but take the
other path into which we turned, and see what the poets have to say;
for they are to us in a manner the fathers and authors of wisdom, and
they speak of friends in no light or trivial manner, but God himself,
as they say, makes them and draws them to one another; and this they
express, if I am not mistaken, in the following words:-
God is ever drawing like towards like, and
making them acquainted. I dare say that you have heard those words.
Yes, he said; I have.
And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say
that like must love like? they are the people who argue and write
about nature and the universe.
Very true, he replied.
And are they right in saying this?
They may be.
Perhaps, I said, about half, or possibly, altogether, right, if their
meaning were rightly apprehended by us. For the more a bad man has to
do with a bad man, and the more nearly he is brought into contact with
him, the more he will be likely to hate him, for he injures him; and
injurer and injured cannot be friends. Is not that true?
Yes, he said.
Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one
another?
That is true.
But the real meaning of the saying, as I imagine, is, that, the good
are like one another, friends to one another; and that the bad, as is
often said of them, are never at unity with one another or with
themselves; for they are passionate and restless, and anything which
is at variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or
harmony with any other thing. Do you not agree?
Yes, I do.
Then, my friend, those who say that the like is friendly to the like
mean to intimate, if I rightly apprehend them, that the good only is
the friend of the good, and of him only; but that the evil never
attains to any real friendship, either with good or evil. Do you
agree?
He nodded assent.
Then now we know how to answer the question "Who are friends? for the
argument declares "That the good are friends."
Yes, he said, that is true.
Yes, I replied; and yet I am not quite satisfied with this answer. By
heaven, and shall I tell you what I suspect? I will. Assuming that
like, inasmuch as he is like, is the friend of like, and useful to
him-or rather let me try another way of putting the matter: Can like
do any good or harm to like which he could not do to himself, or
suffer anything from his like which he would not suffer from himself?
And if neither can be of any use to the other, how can they be loved
by one another? Can they now?
They cannot.
And can he who is not loved be a friend?
Certainly not.
But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he is
like; still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is
good?
True.
But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be
sufficient for himself? Certainly he will. And he who is sufficient
wants nothing-that is implied in the word sufficient.
Of course not.
And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?
He will not.