lysis,-or-friendship   

True.
Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further
object. May we then infer that the good is the friend?
I think so.
And the good is loved for the sake of the evil? Let me put the case in
this way: Suppose that of the three principles, good, evil, and that
which is neither good nor evil, there remained only the good and the
neutral, and that evil went far away, and in no way affected soul or
body, nor ever at all that class of things which, as we say, are
neither good nor evil in themselves;-would the good be of any use, or
other than useless to us? For if there were nothing to hurt us any
longer, we should have no need of anything that would do us good. Then
would be clearly seen that we did but love and desire the good because
of the evil, and as the remedy of the evil, which was the disease; but
if there had been no disease, there would have been no need of a
remedy. Is not this the nature of the good-to be loved by us who are
placed between the two, because of the evil? but there is no use in
the good for its own sake.
I suppose not.
Then the final principle of friendship, in which all other friendships
terminated, those, I mean, which are relatively dear and for the sake
of something else, is of another and a different nature from them. For
they are called dear because of another dear or friend. But with the
true friend or dear, the case is quite the reverse; for that is proved
to be dear because of the hated, and if the hated were away it would
be no longer dear.
Very true, he replied: at any rate not if our present view holds good.
But, oh! will you tell me, I said, whether if evil were to perish, we
should hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar
desire? Or may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and
animals remain, but not so as to be hurtful? And the same of thirst
and the other desires,-that they will remain, but will not be evil
because evil has perished? Or rather shall I say, that to ask what
either will be then or will not be is ridiculous, for who knows? This
we do know, that in our present condition hunger may injure us, and
may also benefit us:-Is not that true?
Yes.
And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a
good and sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the
other?
To be sure.
But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not
evil should perish with it?
None.
Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor
evil will remain?
Clearly they will.
And must not a man love that which he desires and affects?
He must.
Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of
love or friendship?
Yes.
But not if evil is the cause of friendship: for in that case nothing
will be the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil;
for the effect cannot remain when the cause is destroyed.
True.
And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a
reason? and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion
that the neither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil?
Very true.
But now our view is changed, and we conceive that there must be some
other cause of friendship?
I suppose so.
May not the truth be rather, as we were saying just now, that desire